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The  incorporation  of  women  and  their  associations  into  international  markets  and value  chains  is pro-
posed  increasingly  as  a  development  pathway  in Sub-Saharan  Africa.  The  underlying  assumption  is that
exclusion  of individual  women  from  groups  specialized  in supplying  a  single  international  niche  market
is  the  main  obstacle  to  their  development.  Intervention  under  this  assumption  focuses  on linking  women
groups  to international  business  and  development  organizations  (NGOs).  To  validate  this  pre-analytical
choice,  we conducted  a case  study  of  a community-level  co-operative  of women  in Mali  (COPROKAZAN,
Zantiébougou)  that collects  shea  kernels  from  producers  and processes  them into  butter  and  then  trades
the shea  butter  for  the  export  market.  The  choices  made  in  this  co-operative  are  exemplary  for  other
women  Malian  co-operatives  involved  in the  production  of  shea  butter.  The  strategic  direction  taken
by the  co-operative  results  from  developmental  interventions  that  encourage  exclusive  reliance  on  the
links  between  the  women  co-operatives  and niche  markets  in  the  international  cosmetics  industry.  The
case  study  shifted  attention  to the  capacity  of  the  women  co-operatives  to  link  their  handling  of ﬂuc-
tuations  in  supply  to  opportunities  in  a  range  of  markets.  We  found  that  this  in  turn  also  opened  new
opportunities  to a growing  number  of  non-members.  We  then  applied  concepts  drawn  from  the  research
literature  on  shea  in  West  Africa,  market  fragmentation,  competition,  and  path  dependency  to  reframe
our research  focus,  to  examine  how  the  co-operative  in  fact  navigated  this  more  complex  development
pathway  through  co-ordination  at group  and  sector  level.  The  study  concludes  that  a  focus  on  the  pro-
vision and  use  of working  capital,  a strategic  priority  identiﬁed  within  the  studied  co-operative,  opens
new  perspectives  on what  types  of  institutional  arrangements  enable  the  inclusion  of a larger  number  of
women  in  the  sourcing  of kernels.
© 2012 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Sciences. Published by Elsevier B.V.. Introduction
Approximately 80% of the Malian population lives in rural areas.
ainfall-dependent agriculture and livestock husbandry are the
ain sources of income for people working under these risk-prone
gro-ecological conditions. Government and development organi-
ations have explored ways to diversify rural incomes: the shea tree
Vitellaria paradoxa), a native wild species, has been identiﬁed as
ffering strong potential for income diversiﬁcation. The collection,
rocessing and commercialization of shea nuts are almost exclu-
ively under the control of women [1]. The shea sector in Mali falls
nder the responsibility of the Ministry for Women’s Promotion.
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +31 317 482776; fax: +31 317 485616.
E-mail address: amadou.sidibe@orangemali.net (A. Sidibé).
573-5214/$ – see front matter ©  2012 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Scienc
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.njas.2012.06.010 All rights reserved.
However, very few successful attempts to domesticate the tree have
been reported. A more promising strategy appears to be selective
enrichment in cultivated ﬁelds, where tree densities can be 3–5
times higher than in fallows, in combination with selection for trees
with desirable traits in the fruits and nuts, leading to the purposeful
creation of parklands dominated by the shea tree [2].
The fruits of the shea tree contain an edible pulp that can be
used as a snack, especially during the hungry period, the period
at the beginning of the rainy season when food reserves run low
and cereal crops have just been sown. However, its main product
is the nut. After shelling the nut, the kernel can be processed to
provide a fat known as shea butter or beurre de karité. Shea but-
ter is an important ingredient of local diets and serves household
needs as a vegetable fat, for example in combination with mil-
let as a frying medium or added to porridge, and for moisturizers
and soap [3].  There is a huge domestic market for shea butter, and
es. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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ore than 90% of it is consumed domestically and traded in local
arkets. Mali’s share of international trade is less than 10% [4],
elling into markets that range from regional trade networks oper-
ting throughout West Africa to specialized export trade routes to
urope and North America. For instance, the European chocolate
ndustry, in particular after the European Union allowed various
egetable fats to be used as cocoa butter equivalent, exerts a strong
emand for shea kernels on local markets, operating through exten-
ive agent networks [5].  The actors in this value chain are well
o-ordinated, dominated by a few monopolies, and to a large extent
nder male control [6]. The international cosmetic and pharmaceu-
ical industries provide niche markets for ‘improved’ shea butter
f low acidity. International demand is increasing and in response
he organization of trade is being stimulated by numerous inter-
ational development organizations. In a number of cases, market
rganization along the value chain has been linked to Fair Trade
abels [7].  However, this market remains strongly fragmented, a
oint that is explored in more detail later in this paper.
Mali is the world’s second largest producer of shea fruits after
igeria [3].  It is estimated that there are around 20 million shea
rees in Mali. The annual production of shea kernels is about
00,000 metric tons, representing only 50% of the country’s produc-
ion potential [8].  Shea nut is one of the commodity chains that are
eceiving priority from government, donor agencies and develop-
ent organizations, including national and especially international
on-government agencies (NGOs). The gathering of the shea nuts
lone is estimated to contribute 8.5% to agricultural production [8].
urrently, over 500,000 people are estimated to work in Mali’s shea
ector, most of whom are rural women who collect, process and
ell kernels and butter. The ripening of shea fruits occurs during
he labour-intensive rainy season, so women usually store the nuts
or processing at a later date when their labour-time is less con-
trained. However, inadequate storage facilities reduce the quality
f the shea butter.
The Malian support strategy (by the government and develop-
ent organizations) to the shea sub-sector has a strong focus on
uilding rural women organizational capacity to process higher
olumes of good quality shea kernels and butter for high-value
xport markets. In practice this strategy neglects the development
f domestic consumption and local high-value export markets [6].
urrently, the domestic and international chains are not connected
3].  The Malian strategy resembles those of other West African
ountries [9,10] in that it favours the formation of direct linkages
etween women groups and niche cosmetics markets by investing
n upgrading the groups’ capacities to comply with supply con-
racts and quality control assurance in these markets. The emphasis
n global niche markets, driven by externally conceptualized and
roject-based interventions, creates path dependencies and risks
arginalizing low-income women whose livelihoods are partly
ependent on the collection of shea nuts. It also fails to build on
he skills and networks embedded in local trade [11].
This paper focuses on co-related institutional issues in the
evelopment of markets for shea nut, and in the development of
apacity, at various levels, to meet the emergent market demand.
t is based on a diagnostic study that zooms in on how shea nut
o-operatives, mostly with women members, navigate in this sit-
ation, evidenced in the choices they have made over time. It ﬁrst
resents the co-operative COPROKAZAN (La Cooperative des Pro-
uctrices de Beurre de Karité de Zantiébougou)  as a case study, in
rder to reveal its strategic choices with respect to shea nut col-
ection and processing as well as the linkages maintained with
upporting agencies. Three comparable cases are examined of sim-
lar co-operatives engaged in the making of improved butter for
xternal markets. Next, we brieﬂy report on the relation among
OPROKAZAN, support organizations, and the still underdeveloped
ector-based umbrella organization or inter-profession known as of Life Sciences 60– 63 (2012) 29– 36
SIDO [12]. In the discussion section we build on middle-range the-
orizing about development strategies deployed in the West African
shea sector in order to reﬁne our original diagnosis and underlying
assumption. We  reconsider this assumption and conceptualize the
experimental strategy chosen by COPROKAZAN, namely, access-
ing working capital (fond de roulement)  from external institutes in
order to scale up its operations, as an endeavor to create more space
and inﬂuence in the co-operative’s navigation of opportunity in
the face of supply ﬂuctuations. Our study suggests that capacity of
the co-operative to tailor problem solving to its relationships with
its members and non-members in the locality is connected to the
development of co-ordination at higher levels. We  conclude that
previous choices made in shea nut development policy and prac-
tice, particularly the emphasis on single market export-oriented
arrangements, may  constrain such capacity development.
2. Research location and methods
Data collection took place throughout 2010 and 2011, mainly
at Zantiébougou in the Bougouni prefecture, 187 km from Bamako,
and also from Sikasso, on the road (RN7) that connects the two cities
and where the co-operative COPROKAZAN is located. Recently, the
RN7 has been much improved, increasing opportunities for trade.
The constituency of Zantiébougou encompasses 42 villages and
covers 1500 km2. According to the 1998 census, the population
totals 31,316 inhabitants of whom 51% are female. The population is
composed mainly of Bambara and Peulh ethnic groups. Agriculture,
animal husbandry and woodland exploitation are the major eco-
nomic activities. Agriculture revolves around cereal crops, grown
for subsistence, and cotton, grown as the main cash crop. Shea nut
is the main source of income for women [13].
COPROKAZAN was selected because it is the ﬁrst community-
based organization of women  that received external support. It
has pioneered joint learning and action for adding value and
trading shea products and has become relatively independent
of the supporting organizations. The co-operative features very
prominently in the national and international media. The num-
ber of Google hits for this co-operative is higher (3000; accessed
December, 2011) than for the three other co-operatives treated in
this study (less than 600 hits each). COPROKAZAN has also played a
major role in the revival of the inter-organizational network (SIDO):
COPROKAZAN’s president was chosen as the ﬁrst president of SIDO.
Three comparable community-based organizations,
COOPROKASI (at Siby, 35 km from Bamako), Siyiriwa and ULPK
(both in Dioila, 160 km from Bamako) were selected purposefully
in order to compare and contrast the ways in which access to
support and the negotiated relationships with support agencies
were arranged.
Data from the support agencies in the ﬁve villages (20 in total)
were collected through 25 group meetings focusing on the shea
nut value chain, involving women  shea nut collectors and pro-
cessors as well as representatives of the support agencies, 28 key
informant interviews with co-operative members, professionals
working in the sector, and traders, direct observation, and the
gathering of secondary data from project documents, reports and
literature. The interviews were semi-structured, guided by check-
lists in order to cover the same issues with each respondent.
The interviews focused on the respondent’s experience with and
perceptions of the organization of shea butter making and trade
activities. Interviews were conducted also with seven former mem-
bers of the co-operatives who  had chosen to leave the organization.
In addition, over a four-month period, all meetings within the co-
operatives and between the co-operatives and support agencies,
as well as visits by women  groups from shea producing areas not
covered by the study, were attended and monitored.
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. Results
.1. COPROKAZAN Zantiébougou – organizational history and
trategic choices
The organizational history of COPORKAZAN started in one vil-
age, Falaba, in 1991. This village was the home of the former
resident of a national NGO, AMPJ (Association Malienne Pour la Pro-
otion des Jeunes).  She set up AMPJ between 1991 and 1993 when
he began to organize women in her home village into groups. From
994 to 1995, AMPJ helped to strengthen the technical capacity
f the women to make improved shea butter, because the pre-
reatment of the shea nuts and processing practices affect smell
nd colour. In March 1995, a team of women from a newly created
illage group and AMPJ representatives visited a shea project in
urkina Faso, supported by SNV (a Netherlands development orga-
ization) in order to learn more about the recommended practices
or improving the quality of shea butter [14]. In 1995, the women
roup in Falaba started joint trading of shea butter. AMPJ played a
ole in modifying the terms of trade of the shea products sold by the
roup. In our interviews, the informants referred to ‘lopsided terms
f trade’ to indicate that the beneﬁts went to the traders rather than
o the women who bear the burden of collecting and processing
he nuts. One key informant blamed the traders for opportunis-
ic behavior, manifest in their unwillingness to remunerate the
omen according to quality of the butter. It was  the traders who
et the prices for undifferentiated shea kernels and butter that the
omen sold at weekly village markets. This respondent recalled
hat the price in 1992 was 80 FCFA (D 0.12) per kg of butter, when
utter was sold in Bamako and other cities at 250 FCFA (D 0.38) per
g.
AMPJ subsequently provided the women in Falaba with a store-
ouse, a mill and working capital amounting to 300,000 FCFA (D
58.02). The latter was used to purchase butter from women mem-
ers of the village group at 125 FCFA (D 0.19) per kg during the
arvest season, instead of them selling the butter to traders at a
ower price. The group then stored the butter to sell it at a higher
rice (250 FCFA [D 0.38] per kg) later in the season during the period
f low supply.
The change in the terms of trade released funds at community
evel and the group was able to make a substantial contribution to
he building of a maternity hospital in their village. They also bought
 donkey-driven cart and opened an account at a bank with an initial
eposit of 500,000 FCFA (D 763.36). In 1996, these events encour-
ged women groups from a neighbouring village (Sirakoro) also to
ink to AMPJ and they obtained a working capital of 200,000 FCFA
D 305.34) to replicate the measures taken in Falaba. The network
ubsequently expanded to four other villages in 1998 and to a total
f 15 in 1999. In 2000 the village-based women groups federated
nto an apex organization UGFZ (l’ Union des Groupements Féminins
e Zantiébougou).  In this expansion phase all married women in
he 15 villages automatically became members of UGFZ. This open
embership policy made it difﬁcult to ﬁnd a way to allocate fairly
he working capital for purchasing the members’ butter.
AMPJ then succeeded in obtaining ﬁnancial support from the
S-based African Development Fund, which funded further equip-
ent purchase, the development of logistical infrastructure and
dditional working capital of 5 million FCFA (D 7633.59). The work-
ng capital was distributed in portions of 300,000 FCFA (D 458.02)
n each of the 15 villages for purchasing butter from the members.
owever, quality control proved difﬁcult to ensure, according to
he key informants. The open membership policy did not give rise
o a procedure for giving feedback on quality issues to the individ-
al butter processors. Consequently, the butter traded to Bamako
as repeatedly returned for lack of consistency in smell and
olour. of Life Sciences 60– 63 (2012) 29– 36 31
In  2004, AMPJ sought assistance from a volunteer working for a
Canadian organization (CCI – Canadian Crossroads International),
who was specialized in organizational development, to diagnose
how the activities of UGFZ might be improved. The key problem that
came to light was  related to the way  in which women  could become
members of UGFZ without conditions or qualiﬁcation. The diagno-
sis also showed that most of the women  felt alienated from the
apex organization UGFZ. This feeling was linked by the women and
the volunteer to the information asymmetry between the central
unit of UGFZ and the groups at village level. The diagnoses further
indicated that the village-level groups considered the central level
to be privileged as far as the beneﬁts of UGFZ membership were
concerned.
The proposed solution was to modify the organizational struc-
ture and transform UGFZ into a co-operative. The co-operative
became known as COPROKAZAN, which was registered in 2005.
COPROKAZAN demanded that new members pay 1000 FCFA (D
1.53) as an entry fee and 1800 FCFA (D 2.75) as an annual contribu-
tion to the working capital of the co-operative. The co-operative
started with an elected steering committee of seven members,
an elected oversight committee of three members, and a general
assembly of 106 members. In 2009, it had 616 members, including
8 men, located in 32 villages in the constituency.
One of the ﬁrst choices COPROKAZAN made was to concentrate
the processing of shea nuts at a centralized unit in the vicinity of the
co-operative. This generated full-time and part-time jobs for 140
women. Additionally, 6 men  were involved in the milling and the
physical tasks of loading and unloading the collected kernels. Later
on, the co-operative added decentralized processing units located
in the villages to its operational structure, thus reducing the costs
of the gatherers of the nuts of accessing the processing facilities and
thereby allowing more women  to earn income. The management of
the co-operative also began to realize that it needed to ﬁnd a way
to aggregate enough volume to inﬂuence the terms of trade. The
management thus opted to scale up the reach of the co-operative
to all 42 villages in the constituency of Zantiébougou. This decision
had knock-on effects: entry restrictions were imposed on appli-
cants from the already associated villages, and unrestricted entry
was allowed for applicants from new villages, so as to spread mem-
bership opportunity throughout the constituency. As a member of
the steering committee related: As we aim to affect the market of
shea products, we  do not intend to divide the territory of our con-
stituency by concentrating only in some villages and then leaving the
rest of territory to traders.  Another steering committee member fur-
ther explained: Shea productivity ﬂuctuates from year to year but also
from one territory to the other. Covering the entire constituency is then
perceived as a risk management strategy.
The choices made by the co-operative’s management indicate
that ensuring sufﬁcient volume was  an important element in its
strategy to affect the terms of trade by expanding the spatial cov-
erage of its sourcing practices. Initially, the co-operative employed
a clerk with a professional history in sourcing cotton, to take in shea
kernels during the weekly markets. The kernels then were stored in
the villages until needed for processing. The decentralized storage,
according to our informants, impacted negatively on quality. Con-
sequently, the co-operative decided to centralize the sourcing of
kernels and to appoint a co-operative ofﬁcial to control the quality
of the kernels at the point of delivery. The clerk was made respon-
sible for weighing and record-keeping at the co-operative building.
He subsequently found it difﬁcult to explain the shift to a central-
ized intake of kernels and related this shift in practice to a lack of
trust in him on the part of the management.In order to secure a continuous supply of good quality ker-
nels the co-operative decided to guarantee that it would purchase
kernels that met  the standard at a price higher than the price
offered by traders. The differential price and the predictability of
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Fig. 3. Shea butter produced by COPROKAZAN, 2005–2009.
SFig. 1. Membership of COPROKAZAN, 2005–2009.
ource:  Interviews with key informants.
he price proved attractive also to non-members and encouraged
hem to meet the quality standard of the co-operative. Although a
on-member could sell to the co-operative only by using the mem-
ership identity card of a member, the use of the members’ identity
ards was encouraged by the members, because it increased their
wn bonuses at the end of the buying season. Non-members are
eported to have supplied 60% of the collected kernels of the co-
perative. Our respondents conﬁrmed that the ability to use the
o-operative’s working capital in support of this price strategy was
 vital asset.
Quantitative data support our respondents’ historical narratives.
embership in the period 2005–2009 rose steadily, except that
n 2008 no new members were admitted (Fig. 1). The trend in
he supply of kernels shows a more erratic pattern (Fig. 2). Ker-
el supply strongly increased in 2008 (when no new members
Fig. 2. Volume of shea nut kernels s
ource:  Interviews with key informants.were admitted, but non-members’ sales for the ﬁrst time were
allowed through members), and declined in 2009 (when member-
ship strongly increased). Butter production steadily increased over
the period 2005–2009 (Fig. 3).
Our informants explained these trends in terms of the co-
operative’s decision to concentrate on butter production to meet
the demand of foreign buyers. The co-operative collected from its
members some of the kernels on credit and also allowed the mem-
bers to pay the annual contribution to the capital of the co-operative
in kind (i.e., in kernels). Figs. 1–3 suggest that the volume of col-
lected kernels depends less on the size of the membership as such
and more on the inter-play between price, access to processing
facilities, and quality. The buying practices of the co-operative in
turn were strongly related to the availability of working capital. In
2009 the co-operative encountered cash ﬂow problems and had
difﬁculty in purchasing kernels from non-members because there
was insufﬁcient cash available.
ourced centrally, 2005–2009.
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.2. The strategic choices made by three other shea co-operatives
ULPK in Dioila chose to limit the stocking of butter on its own
ccount and to act as broker between the women groups in as large
 number of villages as possible and buyers of the shea butter.
LPK collected information on the quantity of butter available at
o-operatives in the various villages and then arranged a supply
ontract with a trader before buying from the co-operatives and
elling the butter on to the trader. This kept the price to the women
elow the premium paid by COPROKAZAN and also resulted in
rices that ﬂuctuated from contract to contract. ULPK retained 5%
f the total amount of each contract as remuneration for its efforts
nd to sustain its activities.
The co-operative Siyiriwa (also in Dioila) chose to purchase ker-
els from its members but to delay processing until a buyer was
ound for the butter. This meant that the co-operative used most of
ts working capital to buy the kernels and had received no new rev-
nue until it processed and sold butter in the market. It strongly
elied on project funds for ﬁnancing personnel and operational
osts, largely channeled through a public support project funded by
NIDO and implemented by the Ministry for Women’s Promotion.
The co-operative in Siby concentrated on the production of
oaps and skin care products sold to tourists and into niche export
arkets. The shea co-operative was initiated by the support of
n NGO that initially was involved in supporting women  groups
roducing vegetables and mango fruits. We  observed a number
f tensions in the relationship between the central units involved
n the value-adding activities and in sourcing butter, and the
omen groups linked to the shea enterprise. The distribution of
ncome between the central units and the women groups, together
onstituted as a network, according to our respondents lacked
ransparency. Some of the funds received by the co-operative were
llocated to and kept by the central units, which created suspicion
t other levels.
The various choices made by the four co-operatives included in
ur study are summarized in Table 1, as these choices relate to the
ay the co-operatives source, process and trade kernels.
The co-operatives use a combination of members and non-
embers for sourcing kernels in sufﬁcient quantities, a ﬁnding that
s consistent with results reported in other studies that indicate
hat a majority of the women involved in shea nut collection or
able 1
omparison of COPROKAZAN with other three community level organizations.
COPROKAZAN ULPK 
Organizational form Co-operative Federated co-opera
Number of support
agencies
8 6 
Number of villages
from which
members originate
32 45 
Number of members in
2009
616 1627 
Employment at the
level of central unit
17 permanent employees at
central unit and 123
part-time workers at
decentralized units in 6
villages within 15 km reach
5 permanent emplo
clerks of the tech
and 2 custodians
Choices made by the organization
Type of raw material
sourced by
co-operative
Kernels Improved butter 
Organization of processing
Centralization Continued processing of kernel
into butter at the central
facility of co-operative
Underway: the pro
centre is being bu
equipped
Decentralization Decentralization of butter
production underway: 6
decentralized units created
Butter production
decentralized to
village-based co-
ource: Interviews with steering committees of the four organizations and with represen of Life Sciences 60– 63 (2012) 29– 36 33
processing do not belong to formalized organizations [4].  However,
the co-operatives made different choices about what to source,
either kernels or butter. The study of COPROKAZAN suggests that
the purchase of kernels is more relevant to non-members’ inter-
ests and that butter requires more intense management (and hence
requires stricter rules regarding membership) in order to ensure
quality. The choice to focus on processing activities also takes into
consideration the generation of employment. The making of but-
ter generates full-time employment for an exclusive group and
part-time employment for a larger group of women, sometimes
at a central unit and sometimes in decentralized processing units
located in the villages. However, exclusive access to paid labour
generates tension. Recognition of the interests of non-employed
women appears to be a delicate issue for the co-operatives.
4. Analysis and discussion
4.1. The direction taken in policy and practice in the Malian shea
sector
The choices made regarding sourcing, processing and trading
of shea kernels and butter by the co-operatives indicate that the
co-operatives are trying to balance the aggregation of quantity and
securing a level of quality sufﬁcient to negotiate good remunera-
tion in the market. In addition to this strategic balancing of quantity
and quality, the co-operatives are balancing the advantages of cen-
tralization and decentralization of processing and sourcing.
The choices made on these matters from the start have been
inter-twined with the guidance and kinds of support offered by
the support agencies. The ﬁrst women  group in Zantiébougou was
formed by AMPJ, whose president originated from Zantiébougou.
AMPJ subsequently played a brokerage role between the co-
operative and the support agencies (Table 2).
The time line of support projects suggests that NGOs and support
projects tend to cluster around already existing successful commu-
nity organizations and in speciﬁc geographical areas. The support
agencies in the shea sector also tend to exchange personnel and take
over each other’s activities. Our key informants in Zantiébougou
for instance pointed to a regular exchange of staff between AMPJ
and the government-supported Projet d’Appui au Filières Agricoles
(PAFA). The US-based African Development Fund started to support
Siyiriwa COOPROKASI
tive Federated co-operative Co-operative
5 8
28 41
2875 1249
yees (3
nical staff
)
5 permanent employees,
including mill operator
and the technical
director, subsidized by
project funds
33 permanent employees
and 60 women as
part-time workers at the
central facility
Kernels Improved butter
cessing
ilt and
Periodic processing of
kernel into butter
Continued processing of
soap and skin ointment
operatives
Kernel is collected at the
level of village
co-operatives
Butter production in
villages individually or in
groups
tatives of the support agencies.
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Table  2
Linkages of COPROKAZAN to support agencies.
Support agency Sphere of intervention Time of intervention
AMPJ-Mali Initial support to collective action and linkage of the co-operative with other support structures 1991–2000
ADF-USA Infrastructure building, equipment and turnover 1999–2004
CECI-Canada Study tours abroad, capacity building Since 2004
CCI-
Canada
Sending volunteers, capacity building Since
2000Linking to Canadian markets
SODODEVI-
Canada
Organizational capacity 2006–2007
Building, technical guidance, equipment
IICD-Netherlands Computer, software, printer, digital camera training in NTIC 2006–2009
PAFA-Mali Management of waste water, linkage with market, fair-trade certiﬁcation Since 2010
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cource: Interviews with key informant and website of the co-operative (http://www
ote:  The national inter-organizational network SIDO in the shea sector and ﬁnancia
f  COPROKAZAN at the time of the study was president of SIDO.
he co-operatives in 1999. Canadian partners then began to provide
imilar support in projects linking the co-operatives to Canadian
arkets by sending volunteers to assist in organizational develop-
ent of the value chain. Irrespective of the agency, the orientation
f their support remained the development of the value chain to
eet the international niche market for shea products. At the same
ime, the support organizations made an effort to associate their
ork with other successful organizations. Overall the effect has
een to create a path dependency that locks the women  groups
nd co-operatives into effort to gain access to export markets. It
as argued by some of our informants that this orientation helps
he support agencies to establish and maintain their mandates and
egitimacy in their home countries. At the same time it tends to
xclude the women and co-operatives from building the capacity
nd markets of the domestic value chain.
In order to analyse this point further we made an inventory of
5 development interventions in the shea sector, in the regions
amako, Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso, Segou and Mopti on the basis
f the list of actors maintained by FNK (Fédération Nationale du
arité) and Projet karité. Our analysis showed that the majority of
he interventions combined investments in processing equipment
ith building organizational capacity to access international
arkets as the main way to generate income for members. One
orked on the provision of micro-credit; another supported the
roups in the making of business plans. Some linked the groups
peciﬁcally to Fair Trade certiﬁcation and other trade schemes.
AFA for instance provided Fair Trade certiﬁcation to a selection
f organizations as well as enabled the participation of selected
roups in trade shows. Our analysis suggests that the dominant
nderlying assumption is that provision of improved techniques
nd resources and the facilitation of international market access
ositively impacts the incomes and livelihoods of co-operative
embers. We  suggest that because the size of the international
iche market is still small (and vulnerable to economic crises
n these markets), and there is competition among the support
gencies for visibility in the development of the shea sector, such
ath dependency on international trade is risky [7].
One of the main thrusts of the interventions has been to reduce
he fragmentation in the shea nut value chain. The CFC (Common
unds for Commodities)–ProKarité project has taken responsibility
or implementing a series of co-ordination measures. The project
elected as its partners a number of women groups in the areas
here the main NGOs were active: Zantiébougou, Dioila, Siby
olondiéba, and San. A primary objective of the project was to
stablish regional and international consensus on issues of shea
roduct quality as the basis for enhanced traceability along the sup-
ly chain. In addition, the concept of Points Filière Karité (PFK – focal
oints in the shea nut value chain) was introduced, representing the
rst attempt at co-ordination among the various actors in the value
hain. The PFK were designed to serve as focal points for buyersokazan.org/partenaires.htm).
tutions were not listed by respondents as support agencies, although the president
of quality products and as infrastructural facilities through which
shea products of higher quality could ﬁnd better market opportu-
nities, both nationally and internationally. The initiatives taken by
the CFC–ProKarité represent a slow convergence among the diverse
interests in building more effective linkages among stakeholders
along the value chain [15]. The project ended in 2006 but was
followed-up by the creation in 2007 of an inter-organizational net-
work, SIDO, supported by funds left over from the CFC–ProKarité
project. SIDO was  given by the network members an explicit man-
date to enhance connectivity and co-ordination among the actors
in the shea sector. Lobbying and advocacy were also included in its
mandate, primarily to increase the visibility and labelling of shea
products from Mali. Our interviews with key informants in the SIDO
network nonetheless indicate that multiple conﬂicts of interest and
obstructions to its operation remain.
The current president of one of the initial PFKs, namely, the co-
operative in Zantiébougou, was recently elected president of SIDO.
Respondents suggest that her election was related to the inﬂuen-
tial position of the deceased originator of AMPJ and founder of the
co-operative in Zantiébougou, who  was  also an inﬂuential mem-
ber of the administrative council of the CFC–ProKarité project. Her
election to this position tends to conﬁrm that co-ordination efforts
remain anchored in community-based organizations that consti-
tute the core of the established development pathway of the shea
sector. The fact that this in turn tends to lock decision-making in
the hands of a relatively small group of women  may  hamper further
development of concerted action and decision-making.
4.2. Questioning the dominant underlying assumption and
consequent strategic choices
The research for this paper started from the assumption that
the exclusion of women  from co-operatives serving a remunerative
international niche market was  the major development problem in
the Malian shea sector. The case study of the co-operative in Zan-
tiébougou brings into question the pre-analytical assumption. The
study shows how the co-operative navigates in its given market
and institutional environment. We  use the metaphor of navigation
because the co-operative is shown to be making capacitated, con-
strained, collective, and contested choices but does not choose the
choices open to them [16]. The choices open to them have been
made by the support agencies and they frame the pathway by which
the effects of the co-operative are accomplished. The metaphor
also allows us to consider the inclusion of women into markets or
value chains as a continuous process rather than as an on-off effect
[17,18]. Our discussion here links choice making, improvisation
and problem solving at local level to the constrained choices
resulting from linkages with the rules and routines imposed by the
support agencies [19].
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The choice to focus on women groups supplying an interna-
ional niche market has led to a development strategy based on the
eplication of micro-pilots under the stimulus of the support agen-
ies. The institutional changes induced by this strategy have been
etailed in our results and reveal that the problems of fragmenta-
ion and competition have been caused – or at least exacerbated
 by the strategy. We  propose here to shift attention to processes
nd choices that have surfaced in our study that could enable co-
peratives to navigate in and manage contingencies related to the
arket and the material conditions of their performance and that
ould achieve a level of co-ordination at national or sector level. In
his perspective there is potential for a wider portfolio of choices
o be supported and tailored to speciﬁc situations and capacities
f co-operatives. In particular, we built on (1) the priority given by
OPROKAZAN to accessing working capital by linking to an inter-
sted ﬁnance institute; this created ‘space to navigate’ by ensuring
 continuous replenishment of the stock of working capital; and
2), the embryonic co-ordination processes triggered by ProKarité
nd the inter-organizational network SIDO.
The ﬁrst issue, of market choice, has been discussed in the liter-
ture on the development of the shea sector in West Africa. Already
n 1999, Fold and Reenberg [6] noted the neglect of local shea trade.
he local market demands shea nuts and butter the whole year
ound and this pattern of demand would seem to offer some attrac-
ive features if income generation is the goal. However, the terms of
rade are not considered favuorable, neither by development prac-
itioners, nor by the women members of the co-operative. A major
eason is that the temporal variation in supply results in low prices
uring the harvest season. Poor storage facilities during the times
hen supply is relatively low (and thus higher prices are likely)
esulted in produce of poor quality that was rejected by the market
n Bamako. Initially, the options of improving storage, and guar-
nteeing a consistent supply of butter year-round, did feature in
he support agencies’ interventions. However, the increase in the
utual ties between the co-operatives and development organiza-
ions led to a gradual shift in their focus, away from the domestic
arket and towards building an exclusive relationship with buyers
n an international niche market in cosmetics or in Fair Trade [5]
hat appreciated the speciﬁc qualities of shea butter and controlled
he added value.
Quality improvement has been achieved but the size of the
nternational markets the co-operatives can serve remains lim-
ted. In terms of traded volume, the market choice has meant
hat the co-operatives make little impact on alternative market
hannels that could absorb much larger volumes, i.e., their efforts
ave created a specialized value chain that is isolated from the
ndependent agent networks maintained by local traders in the
illages. The only export market for kernels that demands sub-
tantially larger volumes, the European chocolate industry [5],  is
ontrolled by a few dominant players who are largely beyond the
pan of inﬂuence of the co-operatives. Shackleton et al. [11] have
bserved a comparable trend in non-timber forest products in that
he portfolio of development interventions for non-timber forest
roducts emphasizes participation in global value chains on the
nderlying assumption that the greatest potential to impact poor
eople’s livelihoods is found in these global chains. They charac-
erize the linkage with the export market as driven by externally
mposed, project-based interventions and contrast such develop-
ent strategies with a more pragmatic approach building on local
arkets that evolve autonomously with little external support,
nd that utilize domestic actors’ long-standing skills and knowl-
dge in production, processing and trading to meet local, domestic
nd regional demand for the products offered. In his discussion
f export-oriented enterprise development for non-timber forest
roducts, Cunningham [20] emphasizes the importance of organi-
ational structures that source across a wide geographic area and of Life Sciences 60– 63 (2012) 29– 36 35
arrange reliability of supply. In terms of development strategies this
translates into strategic partnerships that seek to level the play-
ing ﬁeld in terms of who  controls the value-added proﬁts along
the value chain. In the case of the shea co-operatives this observa-
tion raises the question whether the choice for (and the resulting
dependence on) a single market channel allows them to exploit
their capacity to ensure a reliable supply of butter and kernels at
sufﬁcient scale, and to control the proﬁts.
We  do not want to argue in favour of a speciﬁc type of mar-
ket channel. Our discussion intends to show the narrowness of the
strategic choices pursued by the co-operatives. We  further note
that the choice for a niche market constrains the capacity of the
co-operatives to diversify and act ﬂexibly in a dynamic market
environment. They are now in a position that makes it difﬁcult
for them to combine their exclusive linkage to their niche markets
with a capacity to negotiate the terms of trade in other markets or
to tailor the seasonality of supply to year-round demand. We  sug-
gest that this position has been deﬁned and consolidated largely
by the support agencies. The co-operatives in our study further-
more have become quite dependent on resources provided by the
support agencies.
The processes that have steered the choices made in the net-
work of supporting agencies originate in the initial conﬁguration
of relationships among the women  groups, co-operatives, NGOs
and public agencies in Zantiébougou. Because each support agency
tended to build its own identity with and through actors in speciﬁc
areas or co-operatives, the sector for a long time remained frag-
mented. Kilby [21] explicitly relates the observed fragmentation to
the proliferation of donors and NGOs, each seeking to support small
projects with speciﬁc groups. A sort of ‘pack mentality’ among these
agencies can be seen in the tendency of each to copy what others
are doing. Koch et al. [22] point to the related tendency of NGOs
to cluster in the same areas where other NGOs are operating; this
is clearly evident in the areas where the four co-operatives in our
study are located. We  further hypothesize that a competitive fund-
ing environment encourages NGOs to adopt intervention strategies
that create in their home countries visibility for their work, and
to initiate projects where the level of attribution is high, such as
by working directly with the women groups involved in making
improved shea butter [23,24].  Sydow [25] similarly has suggested
that the types of solutions that dominate project-led interventions
lead to rigid routines that restrict alternative or complementary
actions by women  groups or sector-based organizations.
It has been argued that an unintended consequence of the
emphasis on small projects for which skilled bureaucrats and man-
agers are recruited is that the quality of co-ordination in a sector
declines [26]. This in turn may  serve to sustain organizational frag-
mentation among local organizations and amongst actors along
a value chain [7]. SIDO’s weaknesses and lack of decisive impact
can be explained by this phenomenon. Edwards and Hulme [27]
report discussions among development practitioners to reveal the
difﬁculty that NGOs experience in interacting with actors and
organizations at higher-than-local levels (at least in a developing
country). Although in the case of shea exclusive relationships have
been created with some of the base organizations and international
companies such as The Body Shop or L’Occitane, Edwards’ and
Hulme’s [27] observation generally still stands. Our analysis and
discussion suggests that neither Atack’s [28] view that NGOs and
the state are complementary agents of development, nor Edwards
and Hulme’s view that the scale effects of localized interventions
are dependent on co-operation with the state, sufﬁciently describe
the processes and relationships we  have observed in the Malian
shea sector.
Another unintended consequence of NGO proliferation and
organizational fragmentation has been examined by Platteau
and Gaspart [29], who  argue that the dependency of NGOs on
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ommunity-based organizations makes their interventions vulner-
ble to capture by local elites. We  have shown that the choice of
GOs in the Malian shea sector to focus on a niche market was
ighly dependent on the performance of those with the capacity to
dopt the technical measures needed to meet the quality require-
ents in the international value chain. We  have noted in our case
tudy also that the co-operative in Zantiébougou was started by a
ember of the local elite who had been employed in the NGO com-
unity based in Bamako. Subsequently a small and selective group
f community members ruled the choice making processes in the
o-operative and employment at the co-operative was  open only
o a few. This evidence is not strong enough to demonstrate elite
apture, although a differentiation between members and non-
embers is clearly visible. Moreover, the interventions made by
he support agencies linked to the co-operatives have depended
n a small number of individuals within the larger development
ommunity. The pattern of their relationships appears to have dis-
ouraged the exploration of other forms of public regulation of the
laying ﬁeld at the level of the shea communities, the value chain,
nd the sector.
. Conclusions
This paper critically investigated the assumption that the exclu-
ion of women from processing and trading opportunities related
o international niche markets is the key development problem in
he Malian shea sector. The international niche market option is
rojected as a viable alternative to domestic and other interna-
ional market channels, where the terms of exchange do not favour
omen groups’ participation. Our analysis and discussion have led
o a reframing of the original assumption, to suggest that the capac-
ty of women groups to navigate in a dynamic market environment
nd to make locality relevant choices is constrained by path depen-
encies on prior strategic choices and measures that have been
etermined in large part by the support agencies, and by their grow-
ng dependence on externally provided resources. Our diagnosis
hifts attention to the processes relating the micro-level perfor-
ance of women groups to meso-level co-ordination. We  conclude
hat initiatives intended to inﬂuence the terms of exchange, and
o secure improved performance by the sector as a whole, are
ot scale neutral. Furthermore, we conclude that the navigation of
hoice by the women groups in the situation described, and their
apacity to inﬂuence the terms of exchange, have strong mate-
ial and spatial dimensions that are constituted in working capital
nd the management of stocks and supply ﬂuctuations. In further
esearch we propose to examine COPROKAZAN’s choices as a nat-
ral experiment in order to further unravel the relation between
roup performance constituted in their material conditions and
rocesses of co-ordination in the enabling environment.
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